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Abstract A competitive market model is considered with M suppliers and N customers, where each
supplier provides a homogeneous service such as energy supply and has to offer a uniform price upon
delivery to all customers. Given a price upper bound U , the model is formulated as an M person game
with pure strategy. It is shown that the M person game has the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if each
customer can be serviced by at most one supplier. Furthermore, this unique Nash equilibrium is peculiar
in that all suppliers adopt the same upper bound price U . In general, the M person game does not have
any Nash equilibrium. For such a case it is demonstrated that the suppliers continue to exercise their price
strategies in a cyclic manner indefinitely.
Keywords: Energy, N person game, Non-existence of Nash equilibrium
1. Introduction
Competitive market models for homogeneous products and services such as the energy sup-
ply can be traced back to 1920’s. The pioneering paper by Hotelling [5] develops a duopoly
model where customers are distributed uniformly over a finite line and serviced by two su-
plliers who choose their locations and prices so as to maximize their profit. Non-existence
of Nash equilibrium, unless the two suppliers are located relatively for apart, is shown by
D’Aspremont et al [2]. Subsequently, the Hotteling model has been extended in several
directions. Economides [3] deals with the case where customers are distributed uniformly
on a bounded plane. Anderson [1] incorporate stackelberg leadership within the context
of the Hotelling model. Other variations include Thisse and Vives [9], Zhang and Teraoka
[10] and Rath [7]. Gabszewicz and Thisse [4] provide an excellent review of the literature.
More recently, for a spatially duopoly model with customers located at different nodes hav-
ing separate demand functions, Matsubayashi et al.[6] establish a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium and develop computational algorithms for
finding the equilibrium point. When mixed strategies are allowed, Takahashi and Sumita
[8] derive two type of Nash equilibriums explicitly for a two person model.
The purpose of this paper is to develope an M person game with pure strategy, describ-
ing a competitive market for homogeneous products and services such as the energy supply.
The market consists of M suppliers and N customers, where each supplier offers a uniform
price upon delivery to all customers. Such a uniform price practice in the energy supply
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industry is still in effect to some extent even after deregulation of the industry in Japan.
Locations of suppliers and customers are fixed and the competitive structures are charac-
terized in terms of costs and prices. Analysis of the price strategy in this realistic setting
has been increasing its importance in the energy supply industry because of deregulation.
The deregulation in principle is intended to derive a variety of ways to lower barriers for
new entry. Large-scale industrial customers are now quite sensitive to prices of the energy
they need, and the industry has been exposed to growing severe price competition. The
thrust of this paper is to show that, except under a rather peculiar necessary and safficient
condition, Nash equilibrium does not exist, demonstrating that the suppliers exercise their
price strategies in a cyclic manner indefinitely.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In seciton 2, a competitive market model is
formally introduced and the game-theoretic framework is established. A necessary and suffi-
cient condition is derived in Section 3 for existence of Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the
Nash equilibrium is unique, if any, and rather peculiar in that all suppliers adopt the price
upper bound U . Finally in Section 4, a duoply model is discussed explicitly demonstrating
the cyclic phenomenon of the suppliers in exercising their price strategies so as to maximize
their profits.
2. Model Description
We consider a market consisting of M suppliers and N customers as depicted in Figure 2.1,
where each supplier provides a homogeneous service such as propane gas or LNG trans-
portation by tank lorry. Each customer may represent one large industry or a group of
residents in the same district. Let M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} and N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be a set of
suppliers and a set of customers repectively. The cost for supplier i ∈M to provide a unit
of service to customer j ∈ N is denoted by cij .
Since the service under consideration is typically an energy supply service, it is natural
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Figure 2.1: M Supplier N Customer Model with M=3 and N=6
to assume that there exists a price upper bound U . In our model each supplier has to offer
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a uniform price upon delivery to all customers, denoted by pii, i ∈ M. Supplier i may offer
the service to customer j only when it results in a positive return to do so. In other words,
a supplier i may offer the service to customer j only if cij < pii . In order to avoid trivial
cases, we assume that each supplier can offer the service to at least one of the customers so
that
min
j∈N
cij
def
= ci < pii ≤ U for all i ∈M . (2.1)
Let Dj be the total demand of customer j. We assume that the production capacity of
each supplier is large enough to cover the entire demand
∑
j∈N Dj . If there exists only one
supplier who offers the lowest price to customer j, the supplier monopolizes the demand
of customer j. Should k different suppliers offer the same lowest price to customer j, then
each of such suppliers would sell Dj/k to customer j .
In what follows, we describe an M person game defined on the strategy set S where
S = ΠMi=1Si ; Si = [ci, U ] i ∈M .
Given piT
def
= [pi1, pi2, · · · , piM ] ∈ S, let Pi(pi) be the payoff function of supplier i . In order to
define the function specifically, the following index sets are introduced. Given piT ∈ S, we
define for j ∈ N the set of suppliers not available to provide service to customer j by
NAj(pi) = {m ∈M| pim ≤ cmj} . (2.2)
We also define for i ∈M,
LEi(pi) = {m ∈M| pii > pim} ; (2.3)
LAi(pi) = {m ∈M| pii < pim} ;
EQi(pi) = {m ∈M| pii = pim} . (2.4)
It should be noted that NAj(pi) consists of those suppliers who cannot offer the service to
customer j because a positive return does not result from doing so, and LEi(pi) is the set of
those suppliers who would eliminate supplier i if they happen to offer the service to the same
customer. Similarly LAi(pi) consists of those suppliers who would be eliminated by supplier
i. With those suppliers in EQi(pi), supplier i would split the demand equally, should they
offer the lowest price to the same customer simultaneously.
Let Wij(pi) be the set of suppliers who would offer the service to customer j together
with supplier i . Using the above notation, Wij(pi) can be written as
Wij(pi) =


{m ∈M| m ∈ EQi(pi) ∩NAj(pi)} if NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) = ø
and i ∈ NAj(pi)
ø if NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) 6= ø
(2.5)
or i ∈ NAj(pi)
where NAj(pi)
def
= M\NAj(pi). It should be noted thatWij(pi) = ø if either supplier i cannot
gain positive profit by offering service to customer j so that i ∈ NAj(pi), or supplier i does
not offer the lowest price to customer j. In the latter case, there exists m′ ∈ M satisfying
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m′ ∈ LEi(pi) and m
′ ∈ NAj(pi), and hence NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) 6= ø. When supplier i offer
the lowest price to customer j, one sees that NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) = ø and i ∈ NAj(pi) so that
i ∈Wij(pi).
Based on these index sets, the following index functions are now introduced.
Iij(pi) =
{
1 if |Wij(pi)| = 1
0 else
(2.6)
Jij(pi) =
{
1 if |Wij(pi)| > 1
0 else
(2.7)
where |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A. It should be noted from (2.5) that ifWij(pi) 6= ø
then i ∈ NAj(pi) so that i ∈ Wij(pi). Hence if Iij(pi) = 1, then Wij(pi) = {i}, i.e. Iij(pi) = 1
if and only if supplier i exclusively provides the service to customer j. Similarly, one has
Jij(pi) = 1 if and only if supplier i jointly provides the service to customer j with another
suppliers. When a price vector pi = [pi1, · · · , piM ]T is given, the payoff function Pi(pi) of
supplier i is then given by
Pi(pi) =
∑
j∈N
Dj(pii − cij)
{
Iij(pi) +
Jij(pi)
|Wij(pi)|
}
, i ∈M (2.8)
where Jij(pi)/|Wij(pi)|
def
= 0 if Jij(pi) = 0 and Wij(pi) = ø .
The following conventional notion in game theory is employed. Given pi = [pi1, · · · , piM ]T ,
we write pi\i = [pi1, · · · , pii−1, pii+1, · · · , piM ]
T and (ai, pi\i) = [pi1, · · · , pii−1, ai, pii+1, · · · , piM ]
T .
Definition 2.1
a) For i ∈M, pi∗i is a best reply against pi\i if Pi(pi
∗
i , pi\i) = maxπi∈Si [Pi(pii, pi\i)] .
b) For i ∈ M, Bi(pi\i) = {pi
∗
i | pi
∗
i is a best reply against pi\i} is called the set of best
replies of supplier i against pi\i .
c)The best reply correspondence B : S → S is defined as B(pi) =
∏M
i=1 Bi(pi\i) .
d)pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by pi∗ ∈ NE, if and only if pi∗ ∈ B(pi∗) .
Of interest is to see whether one or more than one Nash equilibrium points exist, i.e. NE 6=
ø . In the next section, a necessary and sufficient condition is given under which NE 6= ø .
An example is provided for illustrating this case. This condition is rather restrictive however
and normally one hasNE = ø . Section 4 is devoted to exhibit typical strategies of suppliers,
when NE = ø , through a numerical example.
3. A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this section we prove a necessary and sufficient condition under which Nash Equilibrium
points exist for the model defined in the previous section. A few preliminary lemmas are
needed. The first lemma states that, if supplier i is the only supplier to service customer
j when all suppliers offer the maximum price U , then supplier i remains to be the unique
supplier to customer j for any price vector pi as long as supplier i could generate a positive
return from pii.
Lemma 3.1 Let U = [U, · · · , U ]. If NAj(U) = {i} for some j ∈ N , then, for any price
vector pi satisfying i ∈ NAj(pi), one has
Wij(pi) = {i} .
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Proof: From (2.2), it can be readily seen that NAj(pi) ⊂ NAj(U) for any pi ∈ S. Since
NAj(U) = {i} and i ∈ NAj(pi), this then implies that NAj(pi) = {i}. Hence, one has
NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) = ø so that Wij(pi) = {i} from (2.5). 2
The next lemma states that if pi 6= U , then at least one supplier could serve at least one
customer with price less than the upper limit U .
Lemma 3.2 If pi satisfies (2.1) and pi 6= U , then there exists at least one pair of supplier i
and customer j such that |Wij(pi)| ≥ 1 and pii < U .
Proof: Since pi 6= U , there exists at least one i satisfying pii < U . Let j be such that
cij = minn∈N cin . Then one has cij < pii from (2.1) so that i ∈ NAj(pi). We consider the
following two cases.
Case1: NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) = ø
Since i ∈ NAj(pi), one has i ∈ Wij(pi) from (2.5) and hence |Wij(pi)| ≥ 1.
Case2: NAj(pi) ∩ LEi(pi) 6= ø
Let i′ be such that pii′ = minm∈NAj (π)∩LEi(π) pim . Then NAj(pi) ∩ LEi′(pi) = ø . One also
sees that i′ ∈ NAj(pi)∩LEi(pi) implies i′ ∈ NAj(pi). These observations together with (2.5)
imply that i′ ∈Wi′j(pi) and |Wi′j(pi)| ≥ 1 . 2
The third and last lemma implies that if supplier i is the unique supplier for customer j,
then supplier i could increase its price, while remaining to be the single service provider to
customer j, as long as the increased price is less than the nearest price of the competitors.
Lemma 3.3 For pi∗ = [pi∗1, pi
∗
2, · · · , pi
∗
M ] with pi
∗
i < U for some i ∈ M, let ∆ > 0 be
sufficiently small so that
pi♯i
def
= pi∗i +∆ < min
m∈LAi(π∗)
{pi∗m} . (3.1)
Then the following statements hold true for all j ∈ N .
1) |Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| ≤ 1
2) If |Wij(pi
∗)| = 1 , then |Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| = 1
Proof: We first prove part 1) by contraposition. Suppose |Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| ≥ 2 for some j.
Then from the definition of Wij(pi) in (2.5), one has |EQi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| ≥ 2. From (3.1) it is
clear that
LAi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) = LAi(pi
∗) . (3.2)
Since ∆ > 0, it follows from (2.3) and (2.4) that LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) =LEi(pi
∗) ∪ (EQi(pi∗) \ {i}).
From this and (3.2), it is readily seen that
EQi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) = M\ [LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) ∪ LAi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)]
= M\ [LEi(pi
∗) ∪ (EQi(pi
∗) \ {i}) ∪ LAi(pi
∗)]
= M\ [(LEi(pi
∗) ∪ EQi(pi
∗) ∪ LAi(pi
∗)) \ (LEi(pi
∗) ∩ {i} ∩ LAi(pi
∗))]
= M\ (M\ {i}) = {i} ,
which contradicts to |EQi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| ≥ 2 .
For part 2), suppose |Wij(pi∗)| = 1 and |Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| 6= 1 for some j ∈ N . Then from
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part 1), one has |Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)| = 0, and hence Wij(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) = ø . Accordingly from (2.5), one
has either
NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) ∩ LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) 6= ø or i ∈ NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) . (3.3)
Similarly from (2.5), since Wij(pi
∗) 6= ø from the assumption, one has
NAj(pi
∗) ∩ LEi(pi
∗) = ø ; and (3.4)
i ∈ NAj(pi
∗) . (3.5)
From (2.2) and (3.5), it is clear that
NAj(pi
∗) ⊂ NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) . (3.6)
Hence one has i ∈ NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) from (3.5) and (3.6). This, in turn, implies from (3.3) that
NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) ∩ LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) 6= ø. (3.7)
It then follows from (3.4), (3.6) and (3.7) that
SE
def
= NAj(pi
∗) ∩ [LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) \ LEi(pi
∗)]
= {NAj(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) ∩ LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i)} \ {NAj(pi
∗) ∩ LEi(pi
∗)} 6= ø . (3.8)
Suppose i′ ∈ SE. It is clear from (3.8), that i′ ∈ LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) and hence i
′ /∈ LAi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i) =
LA(pi∗) from (3.2). Since i′ ∈ SE, one sees that i′ /∈ LEi(pi∗) . Consequently, one has
i′ ∈ EQi(pi∗). Thus i′ ∈ (EQi(pi∗) ∩ NAj(pi∗)) so that i′ ∈ Wij(pi∗). Since i′ ∈ LEi(pi
♯
i , pi
∗
\i),
one has i′ 6= i, so that Wij(pi∗) ⊃ {i, i′} and hence |Wij(pi∗)| ≥ 2, which contradicts to
|Wij(pi∗)| = 1, completing the proof. 2
We are now in a position to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.4 For the game defined in Section 2, the following two statements hold true.
1) NE 6= ø if and only if |NAj(U)| ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N
2) If NE 6= ø, then NE = {U}
Proof: We first prove part 2) by contraposition. Suppose pi∗ ∈ NE and U 6= pi∗. From
Lemma 3.2, there exists iˆ ∈M and jˆ ∈ N such that |Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗)| ≥ 1 and pi∗
iˆ
< U . We consider
the following two cases.
Case1: Jiˆj(pi
∗) = 0 for all j ∈M
From the definition of Pi(pi) in (2.8), one sees that
Piˆ(pi
∗) =
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
∗) . (3.9)
Let pi♯
jˆ
be as in (3.1). Then from 1) of Lemma 3.3, one has Jiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi) = 0 for all j ∈ M. It
then follows from this and (2.8) that
Piˆ(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi) =
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
+∆− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi) . (3.10)
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From 2) of lemma 3.3, Iiˆj(pi
∗) = 1 implies Iiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi) = 1 so that Iiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi) − Iiˆj(pi
∗) ≥ 0
for all j ∈ N . Since |Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗)| ≥ 1 and Jiˆjˆ(pi
∗) = 0, it is clear that Iiˆjˆ(pi
∗) = 1. These
observations together with (3.9) and (3.10) then yield that
Piˆ(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi)− Piˆ(pi
∗)
=
∑
j∈N
[
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
+∆− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi)−Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
∗)
]
=
∑
j∈N
[
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
+∆− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
∗)−Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
∗)
+Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
+∆− ciˆj){Iiˆj(pi
♯
iˆ
, pi\ˆi)− Iiˆj(pi
∗)}
]
≥
∑
j∈N
Dj∆Iiˆj(pi
∗) ≥ Djˆ∆Iiˆjˆ(pi
∗) > 0 ,
which contradicts to pi∗ ∈ NE .
Case2: Jiˆj(pi
∗) = 1 for some j ∈ N
Since pi∗
iˆ
> ciˆn for any customer n supplied by supplier iˆ, and pi
∗
iˆ
> pi∗m for any m ∈ LEiˆ(pi
∗),
one can choose ∆ > 0 sufficiently small so that pi†
iˆ
= pi∗
iˆ
−∆ satisfies
max
[
max
n∈{n :(I
iˆn
(π∗)=1)∨(J
iˆn
(π∗)=1)}
{ciˆn} , max
m∈LE
iˆ
(π∗)
{pi∗m}
]
< pi†
iˆ
, (3.11)
where the second maximum in (3.11) is ignored if LEiˆ(pi
∗) = ø . One then sees that
LEiˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = LEiˆ(pi
∗), EQiˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = {ˆi} and LAiˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = LAiˆ(pi
∗) ∪
(
EQiˆ(pi
∗) \ {ˆi}
)
.
From (2.6) and (2.7), these observations imply that the following statements hold true for
all j ∈ N .
a) If Iiˆj(pi
∗) = 1 then Iiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = 1 (3.12)
b) If Jiˆj(pi
∗) = 1 then Iiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = 1 and Jiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = 0 (3.13)
c) If
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) = 0 ∧ Jiˆj(pi
∗) = 0
]
, then
[
Iiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = 0 ∧ Jiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) = 0
]
(3.14)
From the definition of Piˆ(pi) in (2.8) together with (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), one then sees
that
Piˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
)− Piˆ(pi
∗) =
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
†
iˆ
− ciˆj)Iiˆj(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
)−
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
†
iˆ
− ciˆj)
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) +
Jiˆj(pi
∗)
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
+
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
†
iˆ
− ciˆj)
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) +
Jiˆj(pi
∗)
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
−
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆj)
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) +
Jiˆj(pi
∗)
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
=
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
†
iˆ
− ciˆj)
[
1−
1
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
Jiˆj(pi
∗)−∆
∑
j∈N
Dj
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) +
Jiˆj(pi
∗)
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
=
∑
j∈N
Dj(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆj)
[
1−
1
|Wiˆj(pi
∗)|
]
Jiˆj(pi
∗)−∆
∑
j∈N
Dj{Iiˆj(pi
∗) + Jiˆj(pi
∗)}
≥ Djˆ(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆjˆ)
[
1−
1
|Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗)|
]
−∆
∑
j∈N
Dj{Iiˆj(pi
∗) + Jiˆj(pi
∗)} .
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Since the first component in the last term is positive, one can choose ∆ sufficiently small so
that Piˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗
\ˆi
) > Piˆ(pi
∗), which contradicts to pi∗ ∈ NE , completing the proof for part 2).
We next prove “if part” of part 1). If |NAj(U)| ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N , then from Lemma
3.1, one has |Wij(pi)| ≤ 1 for all pi ∈ S and i ∈ M. Hence, for all pi ∈ S and i ∈ M, one
has Pi(pi) =
∑
j∈N Dj(pi − cij)Iij(pi). It then follows that
Pi(U)− Pi(pi) =
∑
j∈N
Dj(U − cij){Iij(U)− Iij(pi)}+
∑
j∈N
Dj(U − pii)Iij(pi) . (3.15)
If U ≤ cij for some i ∈ M, then Wij(pi) = ø, and hence Iij(pi) = 0 for all pi ∈ S. This
then implies that the payoff difference in (3.15) is non-negative for all pi ∈ S. If U > cij
(and hence NAj(U) = {i}) for some i ∈ M, then for any price vector pi with pii > cij so
that i ∈ NAj(pi), one has NAj(pi) = {i} from Lemma 3.1. In this case, Iij(U) = 1 and
Iij(pi) = 1 and again the payoff difference in (3.15) is positive for all pi ∈ S. It then follows
that U ∈ Bi(U \i) for all i ∈M, hence one has U ∈ NE , proving “if part”.
For “only if part”, suppose NE 6= ø and |NAjˆ(U)| ≥ 2 for some jˆ ∈ N . From part 2) of
this theorem one has NE = {U}. To emphasize this, we write pi∗ = U . Let iˆ, iˆ′ ∈ NAjˆ(pi
∗).
Since LEi(pi
∗) = ø from (2.3), the definition of Wij(pi) in (2.5) implies iˆ ∈ Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗). Since
piiˆ = piiˆ′ = U , it is clear that iˆ
′ ∈ EQiˆ(pi
∗) thus iˆ′ ∈ Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗), so that Jiˆjˆ(pi
∗) = 1. Let
pi†i = pi
∗
i −∆ for sufficiently small ∆ as in (3.11). Similarly as in the proof of Case2 of part
2), statements (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) hold true. These together with the definition of
Pi(pi) in (2.8) imply that
Piˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗\i)− Piˆ(pi
∗)
≥ Djˆ(pi
∗
iˆ
− ciˆjˆ)
[
1−
1
|Wiˆjˆ(pi
∗)|
]
Jiˆjˆ(pi
∗)−∆
∑
j∈N
Dj
[
Iiˆj(pi
∗) + Jiˆj(pi
∗)
]
. (3.16)
Since the first component in the last term in (3.16) is positive, one can choose ∆ sufficiently
small so that Piˆ(pi
†
iˆ
, pi∗\i) > Piˆ(pi
∗), which contradicts pi∗ ∈ NE , proving “only if part” of
part 2) . 2
From Theorem 3.4, one sees that U is the only candidate to be the Nash equilibrium point.
If U is not Nash equilibrium, then this game has no equilibriums. The algorithm to deter-
mine whether this game has Nash equilibrium or not is quite simple, as presented below.
Algorithm
step1: Let j = 1
step2: Determine whether |NAj(pi)| ≥ 1. If |NAj(pi)| > 1, then one concludes NE = ø.
Else go to step 3
step3: j = j + 1. If j > N , Then NE 6= ø. Else go to step 2
In the remainder of this section, an example of Nash equilibrium is provided. We con-
sider a case that there are three suppliers providing LNG by lorry tankers to six customers,
who are middle-sized industrial users as depicted in Figure 2.1. It should be noted that,
unlike usual city gas through pipeline networks, the transportation costs are considered
to be marginal costs. Although the price and cost vary depending on the condition and
demand pattern, for the sake of convenience, we suppose here U = 60(Yen/m3), and the
values of cij are supposed to be as shown in Table 3.1. When the equilibrium is realized, the
8
Table 3.1: The value of cij when Nash equilibrium is realized
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Figure 3.1: Nash equilibrium with 3 Supplier 6 Customer Model
resulting supplier-customer combinations are shown in Figure 3.1. In this case, the market
is completely separated by the suppliers, where there is only one supplier for each customer.
The rest of the suppliers cannot offer the customer since the cost is above the upperbound
price. However, these situation is rather unnatural. In the next section we show the case
of NE = ø and illustrate how players may continue to behave forever in a cyclic manner in
pursuit of maximizing their profit.
4. Cyclic Phenomenon for Case of Two Person Game
In this section, we illustrate typical strategies of suppliers, when NE = ø. We assume that
there are two suppliers and three customers who are middle-sized industrial users recieving
LNG by lorry tankers, where U = 50 (Yen/m3), D1 = 100 (Mcm/y), D2 = 200 (Mcm/y) and
D3 = 150 (Mcm/y) (Mcm/y=thousand cubic meter per year). The cost variables are given
in Table 4.1. Theorem 3.4 shows that, if U /∈ NE , this game has no Nash equilibriums. In
Table 4.1: The values of cij when NE = ø
( ) *
( *+ ,- ,,
) *. ,+ ,-
/ 0
this example, each supplier tries to obtain the furthest customer demand by setting lower
price than its competitor. This supplier acquires the new distant customer at the expense of
losing profits of the existing near customers since each supplier must set the same delivery
price to all customers. We show this situation through a numerical example as depicted in
Figure 4.1. Since |NAj(U)| = 2 > 1 for all j = 1, 2, 3, one has NE = ø from Theorem 3.4.
9
 
 
	



 


	


















	




Figure 4.1: Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium with 2 Supplier 3 Customer Model
Let pi = U be an initial price vector. For the sake of convenience, we discretize the strategy
set so that each supplier can only take integer prices, and suppose each supplier changes its
strategy in turn so as to maximize its profit. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 show the results of
this simulation. In Figure 4.2, the cyclic behaviour of each supplier under the conditions of
Table 4.2: Each Supplier’s behaviour when NE = ø
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Table 4.1 is depicted. Here the initial price vector is U = [50 , 50], and the first action is
taken by Supplier 1. At the first step, Supplier 1 tries to maximize its profit by setting lower
price of 49 (Yen/m3) than its competitor and eliminate Supplier 2. In return, Supplier 2 also
takes a similar action by setting the price of 48 (Yen/m3). This process continues several
times. At the 4th step, Supplier 2 has no choice but to set the lower price of 46 (Yen/m3) to
secure Customers 1 and 3 at the expense of giving up Customer 2. Since it does not result
in a positive return to provide service to Customer 2 at the price of 46 (Yen/m3), Supplier
2 cannot offer the service to Customer 2. However it is better off to acquire the other
customers even with low average earning per unit instead of losing all customers or splitting
demands of all customers. At this point, Supplier 1 already monopolizes Customer 2, and it
is in a position to enjoy the highest per-unit earning without losing the customer by setting
the upper-bound price of 50 (Yen/m3). And this cyclic process is repeated indefinitely.
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Figure 4.2: Cyclic Phenomenon with 2 Supplier and 3 Customer Model when NE = ø
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